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Tax Reform, Poverty, and
Inequality
Sheldon Danziger
Institute for Research on Poverty
University of Wisconsin Madison
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 is the most significant 
antipoverty legislation of the last decade. It is important not 
only for the $5 billion a year in tax relief it provides to the 
working poor but also because it reflects bipartisan support 
for using the tax system to increase the incomes of the working 
poor. 1 The consensus to aid the poor, which emerged during 
debate over the 1986 Act, is particularly important because 
the Reagan administration had previously disavowed using 
tax reform for distributional purposes. In his 1982 Economic 
Report, President Reagan stated:
As a result of the passage of the historic Economic 
Recovery Tax Act of 1981, we have set in place a 
fundamental reorientation of our tax laws. Rather 
than using the tax system to redistribute existing 
income, we have significantly restructured it to 
encourage people to work, save and invest more 
(p. 6).
The Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA), unlike the 1986 
Act, did not aid the working poor. Quite to the contrary, it 
actually increased their tax burdens. In addition to their 
adverse treatment by ERTA, the working poor have been 
adversely affected by two major economic and policy changes. 
First, the economic stagnation of the past 15 years raised 
poverty and income inequality well above the levels of the 
mid-1970s. And, although the current recovery has been long 
and robust, the poor have gained disproportionately little.
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Second, the Reagan budgetary retrenchment of the early 
1980s reduced income transfers and social spending targeted 
on the poor and the near-poor. As a result, many low-income 
families who would have received benefits had social pro 
grams not been cut receive no benefits today. And, despite the 
beneficial effects of the 1986 Act, the poor still have not 
regained their mid-1970s level of living.
Thus, since the early 1970s, changes in all three mechanisms 
by which income is generated and redistributed the market, 
income transfer programs, the tax system have tended to 
increase poverty. As I show below, the prospects for affecting 
the market-generated distribution of poverty or for reforming 
existing income transfer programs are not good. Thus, if 
poverty is to be reduced by 1990 to the level that existed in the 
early 1970s, even if the economy continues to grow without 
recession, we must move beyond the 1986 Tax Act. Although 
the Act eliminated the personal income tax burden for most of 
the poor, I conclude that further tax reforms offer the best 
way to aid the poor particularly the working poor in the 
late 1980s. Reforms such as those discussed below are feasible 
and are preferred by both taxpayers and the poor to reforms 
which would aid the working poor by taking them through the 
welfare system. But first we must ask whether the reduction of 
poverty is a legitimate goal to pursue.
Why Worry About Equity?
Why should an economists worry about the distribution of 
income in general and poverty in particular? Shouldn't s/he be 
interested in raising productivity and in achieving the most 
from society's scarce resources? Shouldn't the pursuit of 
efficiency be the primary goal? Isn't that why most of the 
papers in this volume emphasize the effects of taxes and tax 
reform on work, saving, capital accumulation, and economic 
growth?
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My answer is "yes, but." If we were starting from an initial 
situation in which the endowments that individuals brought to 
the market had been attained in a market free of imperfections 
such as discrimination, then the answer would be much more 
emphatic for the "yes," and much more wavering for the 
"but." Given an initial distribution of income, the market, 
when all the assumptions of perfect competition are met, will 
produce the most efficient allocation of scarce resources. The 
goods to be produced and the resulting prices will determine 
an efficient post-market distribution of income. If however, we 
judge the initial distribution of endowments unfair, then we 
may want to change the distribution of income that results 
from the market, even if it has resulted from a perfectly 
competitive market process.
This highly simplified textbook example is relevant to the 
theme of this paper because the War on Poverty was premised 
on the belief that both the initial endowments being brought 
to the market by the poor and disadvantaged and how those 
endowments were compensated were adversely affected by 
market imperfections. If one accepts these underlying pre 
mises of the War on Poverty as still relevant 20 years later, 
then there remains a basis for public policies that provide 
more equality and less poverty than currently exist.
A call for expanded use of the income tax to aid the poor 
does not tell us how much more aid could promote equity 
without impairing efficiency. Indeed two recent articles, Joel 
Slemrod's "Do We Know How Progressive the Income Tax 
System Should Be?" (1983) and Anthony Atkinson's "How 
Progressive Should Income Tax Be?" (1983) review the liter 
ature on the optimal income tax and reach no definitive 
conclusions. The answer depends, first, on how we value 
various degrees of inequality, that is, on our social welfare
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function; second, on how responsive taxpayers are to mar 
ginal tax rates; and third, on the distribution of endowments 
that generate the pretax (market) distribution of income. In 
general, Slemrod and Atkinson offer little more than the 
boundaries of the trade-offs, guidelines that argue against 
excessively high marginal tax rates without specifying the level 
at which efficiency losses become large.
Alan Blinder (1982) is much less technical, but much more 
eloquent. He concludes that:
. . . what this country needs now in the realm of 
income distribution policy is exactly what it needs, 
and has often been unable to get, in so many other 
problem areas: An economic policy with a hard head 
and a soft heart. A hard head to remind us of the 
wondrous efficiency of the marketplace, and how 
foolish it is to squander this efficiency without good 
reason. And a soft heart to remind us that champi 
oning the cause of society's underdogs has long 
been, and remains one of the noblest functions of 
government (p. 30).
My call for aiding the working poor through tax reform 
rather than welfare reform is based on a review of the 
efficiency effects of income transfer programs (see Danziger, 
Havemen, and Plotnick, 1981). 2 Because welfare programs 
involve much higher marginal tax rates than those put into 
place by the 1986 Tax Act, providing the same amount of aid 
to the poor through tax reform would have a lower efficiency 
cost than would providing it through welfare programs.
Why Not Rely on Economic Growth?
Why argue that the income tax be reformed further to 
provide more aid for the poor? What about the importance of
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economic growth, which raises rather than redistributes in 
come? Again, a careful review of the empirical literature 
suggests that economic growth is necessary, but not sufficient 
to aid many of the poor (see Gottschalk and Danziger, 1984; 
Danziger and Gottschalk, 1986).
This issue was clearly recognized at the early stages of the 
War on Poverty. In 1964, President Johnson stated:
We cannot, and need not wait for the gradual 
growth of the economy to lift this forgotten fifth of 
our nation above the poverty line. We know what 
must be done and this nation of abundance can 
surely afford to do it (p. 15).
Growth was to be an important tool, but only one of many, in 
the fight against poverty.
The Johnson administration set in motion a vast series of 
policy changes that placed the question "What does it do for 
the poor?" at the top of the nation's domestic policy agenda. 
Robert Lampman (1974) has argued that all government 
programs and policies those related to education and trans 
portation, for example, as well as those related to tax and 
income maintenance programs had to explicitly address 
their impact on the poor. In my view, a major barrier to 
reducing poverty today is the fact that this question now is 
asked only rarely.
When President Reagan announced his program for eco 
nomic recovery in 1981, he stated:
The goal of this administration is to nurture the 
strength and vitality of the American people by 
reducing the burdensome, intrusive role of the fed 
eral government; by lowering tax rates and cutting 
spending; and by providing incentives for individu 
als to work, to save, and to invest. It is our basic
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belief that only by reducing the growth of govern 
ment can we increase the growth of the economy 
(p. 1).
Thus, the question "What does it do for the poor?" was 
replaced by the question "What does it do for incentives to 
work and save?" Irving Kristol (1984), expanding on this 
view, stated that:
The administration's social policy cannot be under 
stood apart from its economic policy which is a 
policy of growth not redistribution.
I believe that this shift in domestic priorities helps explain 
why poverty declined rapidly as the economy grew in the late 
1960s and why poverty has declined so slowly in the current 
economic recovery.
Ronald Reagan is not the only one who has chosen not to 
follow the path I am advocating and not to place antipoverty 
policy via tax reform high on the agenda. Henry Aaron, in 
"How to Make the President's Good Tax Reform Plan Even 
Better," (1985) listed three serious problems with the federal 
income tax: (1) a narrow tax base; (2) unnecessarily high 
marginal tax rates that result from the narrowed tax base, 
with both of these problems leading to distortions in con 
sumption, saving, investment, and production; and (3) the 
deficit, that is, too little tax revenue. Also, in Aaron and 
Galper (1985) one finds much concern with horizontal eq 
uity the equal treatment of those with equal incomes as a 
way to reduce the "tax-induced distortions of labor supply, 
saving, investments and risk taking," but little discussion of 
vertical equity or the need to increase the progressivity of the 
existing system.
The president wanted a bill that was both revenue neutral 
and distributionally neutral that is tax reform that broadens
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the tax base and lowers marginal tax rates in such a way as to 
leave total revenue unchanged, that maintains the existing 
degree of progressivity, and achieves horizontal equity. So if 
Aaron only explicitly criticizes revenue neutrality, he must 
implicitly accept distributional neutrality.
It is evident, therefore, that public policy discussion has 
shifted away from a concern with poverty and inequality. Yet 
recent trends in the level and distribution of family incomes 
demonstrate a need for further reform of the personal income tax.
Recent Trends in Family Income
The period since the early 1970s has been not only one of 
economic stagnation but also one of increasing inequality. 
These macroeconomic changes contradicted two of the key 
assumptions of the War on Poverty-Great Society planners. 
First they thought the business cycle could be controlled by 
the tools of Keynesian economics, so that poverty could be 
fought against a background of healthy economic growth. 
Second, they believed that in such an economy, with low 
unemployment rates and with antidiscrimination policies and 
education and training programs in place, everyone rich, 
poor, and middle class would gain. At a minimum, it was 
expected that economic growth would be proportional and 
that all incomes would rise at about the same rate. At best, 
income growth for the poor would exceed the average rate.
The facts demonstrating the failure of these assumptions 
are clear, but explanations for the failure are much more 
difficult. For most of the post-World War II period, family 
income, adjusted for inflation, grew at an annual rate exceed 
ing 3 percent per year. Since 1973, however, growth has 
been minimal. There were three recessions 1974-75, 1979-80, 
1981-82 and unemployment has remained at the 7 percent 
level through the mid-1980s despite the longer-than-average
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length of the current recovery. By historical standards, the 
current recovery is a very good one, but it is a recovery from 
the very depressed levels of 1981, not an economic high-water 
mark for the economy.
Table 1 compares the average annual growth in mean 
family income, adjusted for inflation, for the 1949-1969, 
1967-1973, and 1973-1984 periods. The two postwar decades 
saw rapid growth in family income among both two-parent 
and female-headed families with children. Mean family in 
comes grew by about 6 percent per year. Between 1967 and
Table 1
Average Annual Rate of Growth of Real Family Income, 1949-1969, 
Compared to 1967-1973 and 1973-1984
Annual Rate Annual Rate Annual Rate 
1949-1969a 1967-1973b 1973-1984C


















































Source for 1949 and 1969 data: Computations by the authors from the computer tapes from
the 1950 and 1970 decennial Censuses. 
Note While the Current Population Survey did not collect information on Hispanic origin in
1967, the decennial Censuses did collect those data.
aDefined as 100 x [(1969 real income 1949 real mcome)/1949 real income] -=- 20. 
bDefined as 100 x [(1973 real income 1967 real income)/1967 real income]   6. 
cDefined as 100 x [(1984 real income 1973 real income)/1973 real income] 4-11.
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1973, growth was about 3 percent per year for two-parent 
families and less than 1 percent for female-headed families. 
Growth per year was actually negative from 1973 to 1984 for 
11 of the 12 rows in the table.
Changes in the mean indicate how the "typical" family 
fared, but they obscure the differing patterns of income 
changes that have occurred for families at different positions 
in the income distribution. To see how families of "low," 
"middle," and "high" income have fared, we classify families 
with children into one of five quintiles and compute the 
percentage of income received by each of these fifths of 
families. Changes in income shares provide a useful indicator 
of changes in income inequality.
Just as with mean family income, the trend in quintile 
shares since 1967 differs dramatically from the period covering 
1949 to 1969. Chart 1 shows the change in the proportion of 
aggregate income received by each quintile during the 1949- 
1969 and 1967-1984 periods. During the earlier period, the 
income distribution shifted somewhat toward less inequality 
as the lowest quintile increased its share and the shares of the 
other four quintiles declined a small amount. The share of the 
lowest 20 percent of all families with children increased by 
1.02 percentage points while the share of the highest 20 
percent declined by 0.25 percentage points. Between 1967 and 
1984, inequality increased the income share of the bottom 
three income quintiles declined and the share of the top two 
increased. The share of the bottom quintile declined by 2.43 
percentage points while the share of the top quintile increased 
by 3.59 percentage points.
Table 2 shows the mean income in constant 1984 dollars for 
each quintile of families with children. Also shown are the 
mean incomes of these families and the percentage of persons 
in them with income below the poverty line. 3 The mean
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ALL FAMILIES WITH CHILDREN
DIFFERENCES IN QUINTILE SHARES
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income in a quintile changes when its income share changes 
and when the amount to be shared (aggregate income) 
changes. For example, between 1967 and 1984, mean income 
for all families increased by 4.1 percent, but the share of the 
lowest quintile declined sufficiently to result in a 34.3 percent 
decline, from $9347 to $6142. Over the same period, the mean 
income of the highest quintile increased from $54,665 to 
$62,198 because its share of the growing mean increased. A 
typical family in the second quintile lost 13 percent ($18,950 to 
$16,491) while one in the fourth quintile gained 11.1 percent 
($33,276 to $36,967). Thus, there were shifts in income not 
only from the poorest to the richest families, but also from 
lower-middle-income to upper-middle-income families.
Table 2
Mean Income of Families with Children by Income Quintile 
in Constant Dollars, 1967-1984 (1984) dollars)






























































"Percentage of all persons in these families with incomes below the official poverty line.
With mean incomes declining and inequality increasing, it 
comes as no surprise that poverty rates increased between 
1973 and 1984. The last column of Table 2 shows the 
incidence of poverty using the federal government's official 
definition of poverty. Poverty for all persons living in families
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with children declined between 1967 and 1973, increased 
somewhat between 1973 and 1979, and then increased rapidly 
between 1979 and 1984.4
What has happened in the past 15 years is clear—income 
growth has been disappointing on average, and poverty and 
inequality have increased. The reasons put forward for these 
disappointing economic developments can be catalogued as 
resulting from demographic changes, from economic changes, 
or from government policy changes. All have been advocated 
as the primary causal factor by one or more analysts. My own 
view is that each has probably been important, but that we do 
not have enough evidence to carefully apportion the blame.
Let me merely list some of these factors:
• Demographic changes. The baby-boom generation surged 
into the labor market, as did wives. The economy created 
many new jobs, but wage rates were often low. The ratio of 
female to male wages did not rise despite the occupational 
and experience gains by many women. Unemployment 
rates remained high. Divorce rates increased as did the 
percentage of children born out of wedlock.
• Oil price shocks. These price changes first caused rapid 
inflation and severe economic dislocations in oil-importing 
areas of the nation; then, deflation and dislocation in 
oil-producing areas.
• Changes in industrial structure. Manufacturing employment 
declined; employment in service industries increased. Inter 
national competition and an aging domestic capital stock 
contributed to these changes.
• Disincentives due to government programs. Because govern 
ment benefits increased at the same time employment 
opportunities decreased, some workers who would have 
taken low-wage jobs dropped out of the labor force and 
drew on government benefits instead. 5
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The Redistributive Effects of the Personal 
Income Tax, 1964-1985
While the income distribution was moving slowly toward 
greater equality in the two post-World War II decades, so was 
the personal income tax. Minarik (1985) notes that the two 
most important devices promoting this trend were the intro 
duction of the minimum standard deduction in 1964 and the 
earned income tax credit in 1975. Progressivity also increased 
for the unintended reason that inflation was pushing middle- 
and upper-middle-class taxpayers into higher and higher 
marginal tax brackets. Many analysts believe that these higher 
marginal tax rates produced great dissatisfaction with the 
personal income tax and contributed importantly to the 
popularity of President Reagan's goal of reduced taxation.
Okner's (1979) simulation analysis shows the total impact of 
the tax cuts of 1964, 1969, and 1975 to have been moderately 
progressive. The top 10 percent of tax filers received about 10 
percent of the 1964 cuts, 1 percent of the 1969 cuts, and actually 
paid increased taxes after the 1975 tax cut. Congress rejected, 
however, a progressive 1978 Carter administration tax-cut pro 
posal. In its place, the 1978 cut Congress enacted allocated only 
about 5 percent of the tax cut to the bottom 50 percent of 
taxpayers, and about half to the top 10 percent.
Okner and Bawden (1983) show that while the 1981 Eco 
nomic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) reduced total tax revenues 
by a much larger amount than the 1978 cut, the distribution of 
the cuts was similar. The 1981 cuts were mostly proportional 
with respect to taxes paid. Because a proportional tax cut does 
not aid low-income households which pay no taxes, the 1981 
cuts were regressive with respect to household incomes.
While ERTA addressed the problem of high marginal tax 
rates by cutting the top tax rate to 50 percent on all forms of 
income and by proportionally cutting all other rates, it clearly
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reversed the pro-poor tilt of all the post-1964 tax changes. 
According to Minarik:
... the 1981 tax law can be judged unambiguously, 
at least by our post-1964 standards, to have been 
unfair to the poor; taxes of sub-median-income 
families have gone up since 1980, while the taxes of 
the better off went down (p. 41).
The anti-poor effects of the 1981 tax law, in marked contrast 
to the pro-poor effects of the 1986 Act, were not explicitly 
discussed in Congress.
The tilt toward the poor and near-poor up to 1975, and the 
tilt away from them between 1975 and 1985 are evident in 
Table 3, which is adapted from Steuerle and Wilson (1986). 
The first six columns show the average and marginal income 
tax rates for a four-person family with income at one-half the 
median income and at the poverty line, for selected years 
between 1950 and 1985, and projections for 1990. Column 7 
shows the total (employer plus employee) payroll tax rates 
that might be added to both the average and marginal rates if 
one were to examine the combined effects of federal taxes.
In the case of the federal personal income tax, 1975 marks 
the year of its most progressive treatment of the poor. This 
was the year in which the earned income tax credit (EITC), 
which subsidizes the earnings of low-income families with 
children, was introduced. In the next decade, all three major 
pro-poor devices in the personal income tax were severely 
eroded by inflation—the EITC, the minimum standard deduc 
tion (also known as the zero bracket amount), and the 
personal exemption. For example, in 1975, because of the 
EITC, a family of four at the poverty line received a federal 
income tax credit of $250 (-4.55 percent of $5497). By 1985, 
this family paid $370 in income taxes (3.37 percent of 
$10,988), for an increase of $620. If one adds the increased
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social security taxes over this decade, then the increased tax 
burden is about equal to the amount of food stamps the 
poverty-line family of four could have received in 1985. (But 
food stamps do not fully offset the taxes of all of the poor 
because some families at the poverty line are ineligible for 
food stamps due to asset limits or other administrative rules, 
and others fail to apply for them.)
As discussed in the next section, by 1990, the average tax 
rate will again be negative for this poverty-line family because 
all three pro-poor devices—the standard deduction, the per 
sonal exemption, and the EITC were increased and indexed to 
inflation by the 1986 Act. Also, the marginal tax rate in 1990 
will drop back to the 1975 level.
Table 3 
Average and Marginal Income Tax Rates for Four-Person Families*














































































Source: Adapted from Steuerle and Wilson (1986).
aA negative rate implies that the earned income tax credit exceeded the tax liability.
bEmployer plus employee share.
cSteuerle and Wilson's projection
Table 3 also shows that a family at one-half the median (a level 
in 1985 that was about 150 percent of the poverty line) was aided 
only slightly by the 1986 Act. Its average tax rate in 1990 will be 
midway between the 1975 and 1985 average rates. But the 
difference in rates between 1985 and 1990 is only 1 percent of 
family income for those at one-half the median, while it is almost
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9 percent for the family at the poverty line. This result reinforces 
my view that further tax relief should be targeted on the 
low-income population.
The data presented thus far make it clear that the trend toward 
greater poverty and income inequality did not begin with the 
election of Ronald Reagan. In fact, much of the damage on both 
the income side and tax side occurred because of the high rates 
of inflation of the late 1970s. Inflation eroded the value of the 
pro-poor income transfers (which, except for those to the aged, 
were not indexed to prices) and the pro-poor components of the 
personal income tax. But the trends were unabated under 
Reagan, even though inflation slowed, because transfers were cut 
as part of the budgetary retrenchment and ERTA did nothing to 
correct the past or prevent further erosion of the pro-poor tax 
components.
That the recent tax changes have been quantitatively impor 
tant can be seen in Table 4, which shows Census Bureau data 
that account for all taxes paid. Unlike the data presented thus 
far, these data allow us to break the increased inequality in the 
income share of households between 1980 and 1983 into two 
components. The first, shown in column 5, is due to changes in 
money income before taxes, reflecting (1) changes in cash income 
transfer programs, (2) results from recession, and (3) other 
economic factors. The second component, shown in column 6, 
reflects changes in state and local as well as federal income and 
payroll taxes.
The total difference between 1980 and 1983 in after-tax 
income shares, shown in column 7, reveals that each of the 
bottom four quintiles lost ground over this three-year period. 
The top quintile increased its income share by 1.4 percentage 
points, which amounts to a net increase of about $2000 per 
household. The decline in the income share of the first quintile 
was due entirely to pretax income changes. The declines for the
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other three were splint between pretax changes and tax changes. 
About one-third of the increased income share of the highest 
quintile was due to tax changes.
Unpublished tabulations from the Congressional Budget Of 
fice show a similar effect of federal tax changes on poverty. They 
show that in 1979, 675,000 people were taken into poverty by 
federal taxes; by 1984, this number had increased to 2,426,000.
Thus, a significant portion of the trend toward greater poverty 
and inequality in the period since the mid-1970s can be attrib 
uted to either direct government tax and transfer policy changes 
or to the failure of government policy to respond to poor 
economic performance. Although precise data that fully account 
for changes in taxes paid and all types of noncash transfers and 
employer-provided fringe benefits received are unavailable, it is 
probably the case that the distribution of after-tax income is 
more unequal today than at any time in the past 30 years.
Table 4
Percentage Share of Aggregate Income Received by Each Fifth 
of Households, before and after Taxes, 1980 and 1983
Difference Between 1980 and 










































































Source: For 1980, U.S Department of Commerce (1983), p 11; for 1983, U S. Department
of Commerce (1985), p. 3. 
aDefined as (column 3 - column 1).
bDefined as (column 4 - column 3)—(column 2 - column 1) 
cDefined as (column 6 + column 5), which is equal to (column 4 - column 2). 
dMay not sum to 100.0 or 0.0 because of rounding
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The Tax Reform Act of 1986
The major goal of the 1986 Tax Reform Act was to lower 
tax rates and broaden the tax base. The law now has only two 
tax brackets—15 percent and 28 percent (although because of 
the surcharge and phaseout of the personal exemption at 
higher income levels, some taxpayers will face an effective rate 
of 33 percent). And many tax preferences were reduced or 
eliminated. The 1986 Act departed somewhat from distribu 
tional neutrality by raising corporate taxes. As a result, it 
provided disproportionate tax relief to the working poor while 
approximating revenue neutrality.
The major changes benefiting the poor are the increase in 
the personal exemption from $1080 to $2000 by 1989; an 
increase in the standard deduction for joint filers from $3670 
to $5000 and for single heads of households from $2480 to 
$4400; and an increase in the maximum earned income tax 
credit from $550 to $800 by 1987. All of these devices are also 
indexed for inflation. As a result, about six million poor and 
near-poor taxpayers will be removed from the tax rolls.
Except for the poor, however, there will be little change in 
the overall progressivity of the income tax. This is because the 
expanded tax base increased progressivity to about the same 
extent as the reduced number of tax brackets lowered progres 
sivity. 6 Table 5 shows recent estimates of the distributional 
effects of the 1986 Act (U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on 
Taxation, 1986). For each income class, column (1) shows the 
average tax change; column (2), the average 1986 tax liability; 
and column (3) the percentage change in tax liability. Since the 
percentage reduction in tax liability generally falls as income 
rises, the overall effect is progressive.
There are, however, very large differences within income 
classes. Minarik (1986) refers to the Act as a "massive
105
Table 5 
























































Source: U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Taxation (1986).
aDefined as column 1, tax change, divided by 1986 tax liability that would have resulted if Tax
Act had not been passed times 100.
reshuffling," that is, as one primarily promoting horizontal 
equity. He points out that in the highest income brackets, the 
net change shown in Table 5 results from a situation in which 
about 45 percent of filers in the highest income bracket face 
tax increases of about $50,000, while the remaining 55 percent 
have tax reductions of about $53,000.7 Taxpayers with similar 
incomes will now pay tax rates that are much more similar 
than before because of the expanded tax base and the reduced 
number of tax brackets.
Under the new law, many fewer people will be taxed into 
poverty by the federal income tax and many more families 
with children will receive credits from the expanded EITC. 
Yet these changes will do little to offset the large increase in 
poverty and inequality that characterizes the period since 
1973. It is against this background of economic and policy
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changes that I advocate further tax reforms targeted on the 
poor and near-poor.
Some Further Tax Reforms
What else would I do to reform the income tax in such a 
way as to provide greater assistance to the working poor and 
near-poor without taking them through the welfare system? 
Ideally, I would replace the personal exemption with a per 
capita refundable credit. Lerman (1985) proposes an annual 
$600 refundable per capita credit which would be made 
available only to those who do not itemize deductions. Such a 
credit would be administered in the same fashion as the 
Internal Revenue Service currently administers the EITC. 
With a marginal tax bracket of 15 percent, a $600 credit would 
be equal to an exemption of about $4000; for the 28 percent 
bracket it equals an exemption of $2143. Thus almost all of 
the additional costs associated with the credit would be 
targeted on taxpayers in the 15 percent bracket. Obviously, a 
refundable per capita credit better targets foregone revenue on 
those with lower incomes than would be the case if the same 
amount of revenue was foregone by raising the personal 
exemption.8
An even more ambitious proposal (Garfinkel and Have- 
man, 1983) would raise the value of the per capita refundable 
credit, and in return replace both the personal exemption and 
the Food Stamp program. The rationale is that such credits 
can effectively target funds upon the poor, lower their mar 
ginal tax rate, and avoid the stigmatization of recipients and 
the higher administrative costs of welfare programs. For 
example, a family of four with no other income is currently 
eligible for about $4000 per year in Food Stamps and faces a 
benefit reduction rate (marginal tax rate) in that program of 
33 percent. With a refundable credit of $1000 per person, the
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family with no other income is equally well off, and the only 
marginal tax rate comes from the payroll tax, not the sum of 
the payroll tax and Food Stamp rates.9 Of course, since the 
current personal exemption is not refundable, and many poor 
and near-poor families do not participate in the Food Stamp 
program, such a change would require additional revenues.
The lower marginal tax rates in the reformed income tax, 
however, provide a more efficient mechanism for raising 
revenue to aid low-income families than did the old rates. 
With the lower rates, the work disincentive effects of raising 
taxes decline. Assume, for example, that these refundable 
credits will be financed by broadening the tax base—say, by 
taxing the employers' contribution for health insurance. With 
only two brackets, a smaller percentage of the population will 
be shifted into a higher marginal tax bracket by this base- 
broadening than would have been so shifted under the 
pre-1986 rate structure. For most people then, any base- 
broadening will have only an income effect (reduced income) 
promoting greater work effort; only a small number will have 
an altered substitution effect (since few change tax brackets) 
promoting lower work effort. For the beneficiaries of such 
expanded credits, the income effect will lead to less work but 
the substitution effect will lead to more work because the 
credits will take the place of a welfare program, which had 
higher marginal tax rates.
A second reform would make the child care tax credit 
refundable. The current nonrefundable credit allows couples, 
when both spouses work, and working single parents, to 
partially offset work-related child care costs. Only about 1 
percent of the poor two-parent families and 6 percent of poor 
single-parent families make use of the nonrefundable credit 
(Steuerle and Wilson, 1986). One the other hand, higher- 
income taxpayers receive credits up to $960 if they have more 
than one child and if they spend at least $4800 on care.
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The credit begins at 30 percent for families with incomes 
below $10,000. Consider the case of a single mother of one 
child who works part time, earns $5.00 per hour for 1500 
hours per year, and spends $1.50 per hour, or $2250, to keep 
her child in a day care center while she works. If this is her 
only income, she will not have a positive income tax liability 
(indeed the expanded EITC will offset a portion of her social 
security taxes). Her potential child care credit—$675, or 30 
percent of $2250—is thus of no value to her because it is not 
refundable. Refunding this credit would not only raise her net 
income, it would also make welfare recipiency less attractive.
Conclusion
In sum, I have argued that the 1986 Tax Act was an 
important addition to antipoverty policy. However, in the late 
1980s, inequality of family income is continuing to increase, 
and poverty is only slowly declining, despite a robust eco 
nomic recovery. The pro-poor extensions of tax reform that I 
have proposed would not threaten any of the efficiency 
accomplishments of the recent tax reform and would have 
much smaller work and family disincentive effects than would 
any alternative plan to aid the poor through the welfare 
system.
The Tax Reform Act has helped to refocus attention on the 
question "What does it do for the poor?" The further reforms 
suggested here reemphasize this question without rejecting the 
Reagan-era question "What does it do for incentives to work 
and save?"
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NOTES
1. As an indication of the relative magnitude of the tax relief, note that the 
total cost of Food Stamp benefits is estimated at $10.9 billion in fiscal year 
1987.
Ill
2. This review suggests that total spending on all major income transfer 
programs reduced annual hours of work in the economy by about 4.8 
percent in the late 1980s. One should not conclude from this that marginal 
changes in transfer programs would cause large efficiency losses.
3. The federal government's official measure of poverty provides a set of 
income cutoffs adjusted for household size, the age of the head of the 
household, and the number of children under age 18. (Until 1981, sex of 
the head and farm/nonfarm residence were other distinctions.) The cutoffs 
provide an absolute measure of poverty that specifies in dollar terms 
minimally decent levels of consumption. To make them represent the same 
purchasing power each year, the official poverty thresholds are updated 
yearly by an amount corresponding to the change in the Consumer Price 
Index. In 1985, the poverty lines ranged from $7231 for a family of two to 
$22,083 for a family of 9 or more; the line for a family of four was $10,989.
4. Care must be taken in interpreting the official poverty data. When the 
poverty thresholds were set in the mid-1960s, the poor received few in-kind 
transfers and paid little in taxes. Therefore, one could at that time 
legitimately compare cash income with the official poverty lines to obtain 
a fairly accurate picture of resources available to meet the families' needs. 
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, noncash transfer benefits 
increased rapidly. While these noncash benefits represented only 12 
percent of outlays on income-tested programs in 1966, the figure had risen 
to about 70 percent by 1983. Clearly a better measure of a family's ability 
to meet its needs should include the value of in-kind programs.
Likewise, taxes detract from the availability of resources to meet needs. 
If taxes had not increased very much over this period they could be 
ignored, since the original poverty definition was based on income before 
taxes.
Unfortunately, we do not have a consistent time series for poverty which 
adjusts for both taxes and the value of in-kind transfers. Nonetheless, 
while the inclusion of in-kind transfers would reduce the extent of poverty 
in any single year, and the subtraction of taxes paid would increase it, they 
would not significantly alter the trends discussed here.
5. My own view is that the disincentive effects of government programs 
have been exaggerated in the media and in such books as Charles Murray's 
Losing Ground (1984). For a review, see Danziger and Weinberg (1986).
6. The issue of increasing the progressivity of the income tax is completely 
separate from the move from multiple tax brackets to only a few brackets.
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Hall and Rabushka (1985) show this explicitly in The Flat Tax, by 
presenting a table that shows various combinations of an adult exemption 
and a marginal tax rate that raise the same revenue. For example, while 
their basic plan contains an adult allowance of $5500 and a rate of 19 
percent, one could choose an equal-cost more progressive plan with an 
allowance of $6600 and a rate of 23 percent.
7. Minarik's estimate was made before the tax bill was finalized. These 
numbers are, thus, merely suggestive of the reshuffling created by the Act.
8. For the poor, a refundable credit is clearly preferable to the exemption. 
Consider a family with no tax liability under current law—that is, all of its 
exemptions and deductions exactly offset its tax liability. Now assume that 
the family has another child. The additional exemption is worth nothing if 
family income is unchanged. However, the family would receive the full 
value of the refundable credit.
9. Depending on the amount of earnings, however, the relevant compar 
ison may be between the 33 percent rate under Food Stamps and a 22 
percent rate: the sum of the employee share of the payroll tax and the first 
bracket rate of 15 percent. This is because, under the exemption, the 
marginal income tax is zero until a tax threshold is reached which equals 
the sum of the standard deduction and the exemptions, while under a per 
capita credit, the tax threshold falls to the standard deduction only.
